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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Until late 2008, Sprint Nextel Corporation 
(collectively with its operating subsidiaries, including Sprint 
Spectrum L.P., “Sprint”) included a flat-rate early termination 
fee (“ETF”) provision in its cellular telephone contracts, 
which allowed it to charge a set fee to customers who 
terminated their contracts before the end date stated in the 
contract.  Because many consumers believed that flat-rate 
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ETFs were illegal penalties, various class action lawsuits 
were brought against cellular phone service providers who 
charged flat-rate ETFs, including Sprint.  In the case before 
us now (the “Larson” action), the plaintiffs entered into 
negotiations with Sprint, and, after five months of mediation, 
the parties decided to settle the matter for $17.5 million, 
pursuant to the terms of their agreement (the “Settlement 
Agreement”).  Over objections lodged by several class 
members, the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey certified the settlement class and approved the 
Settlement Agreement.  Objectors Lina Galleguillos, 
Antranick Harrentsian, and Michael Moore (collectively, the 
“Galleguillos Objectors”), along with Jessica Hall, appealed.1  
Because the District Court did not adequately protect the 
rights of absent class members, we will vacate its order and 
remand the matter for further proceedings.   
 
I. Background  
 
A. Class Action and Settlement Agreement 
 
A flat-rate ETF is one that does not vary during the 
term of the contract.
2
  At the time the Larson class action was 
                                              
1
 Two groups of attorneys also appealed, challenging 
the District Court‟s allocation of attorneys‟ fees.  Because of 
the nature of our disposition, we will not address those 
appeals. 
2
 A flat-rate ETF stands in contrast to what is known as 
a prorated ETF.  A prorated ETF is an “[ETF] contract 
provision that is structured such that the initial amount of the 
[ETF] will decrease over the term of the contract in some 
incremental form, resulting in a termination fee at the end of 
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filed, if a Sprint customer terminated a contract prior to the 
end of the contract term, Sprint would impose a flat-rate ETF 
of approximately $200.  The Larson plaintiffs filed their suit 
in the District Court on November 5, 2007, alleging that the 
flat-rate ETFs charged by AT&T Mobility, LLC (“AT&T”) 
and Sprint were illegal penalties that violated the Federal 
Communications Act and state consumer protection laws.  
The Complaint was amended twice, with the Second 
Amended Complaint, as discussed in greater detail herein, 
being filed by five plaintiffs (the “Class Representatives”).  
Each of the Class Representatives was charged a flat-rate ETF 
by Sprint.
3
   
 
 Sprint moved to dismiss the Larson action pursuant to 
Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, but before the District Court rendered a decision 
on that motion, the Class Representatives and Sprint entered 
into mediation of the dispute, under the guidance of a retired 
                                                                                                     
the contract term which is lower than the initial termination 
fee.”  (Appellants‟ Joint Appendix (“AJA”) at 273.)  Prorated 
ETFs are not at issue in this case. 
3
 The plaintiffs named in the original Complaint were 
three individuals who were charged a flat-rate ETF by Sprint 
and one who was charged a flat-rate ETF by AT&T.  The 
Second Amended Complaint did not include the 
representative who was charged a flat-rate ETF by AT&T, 
and added two additional individuals who were charged a 
flat-rate ETF by Sprint.  Thus, none of the Class 
Representatives in the Second Amended Complaint were 
charged a flat-rate ETF by AT&T.  AT&T was not part of the 
eventual settlement and is not a party to this appeal. 
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judge of the District Court.  After approximately five months 
of negotiations, on December 3, 2008, the parties agreed to 
settle the matter for $17.5 million, comprised of $14 million 
in cash and $3.5 million in activation fee waivers, bonus 
minutes, and credit forgiveness (collectively, the “Common 
Fund”).4  In addition to the monetary relief, the Settlement 
Agreement also enjoined Sprint from entering into new fixed-
term subscriber agreements containing flat-rate ETFs for a 
period of two years, effective January 1, 2009.
5
  Along with 
                                              
4
 If the claims paid out of the cash portion of the 
Common Fund were to exceed the amount available in the 
Common Fund, all cash benefits would be reduced pro rata.  
Any cash that remained in the Common Fund after the close 
of the claim period was to be converted into a cy pres award 
for distribution to an organization qualifying as tax exempt 
under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, or any other 
organization or institution agreed upon by the parties.  After 
execution of the Settlement Agreement, the parties agreed 
that any money remaining in the Common Fund would be 
used to purchase prepaid long distance calling cards for use 
by members of the U.S. armed forces and their families.   
5
 At oral argument, Sprint indicated that it had not 
collected flat-rate ETFs since December of 2010.  In a letter 
submitted pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
28(j), counsel for the Class Representatives confirmed that 
fact, indicating that the last flat-rate ETF contract expired on 
December 31, 2010.  Thus, even after the Settlement 
Agreement‟s two-year injunction prohibiting Sprint from 
including flat-rate ETFs in subscriber agreements ended on 
January 1, 2011, it appears that Sprint has not yet resumed 
including flat-rate ETFs in customer contracts.    
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ending the Larson action, the Settlement Agreement 
expressly resolved ten other lawsuits pending in various state 
courts, but it excepted certain claims that were being asserted 
in a California-only state court class action against Sprint 
captioned Ayyad v. Sprint Spectrum, LLP (“Ayyad”).  
 
 The Settlement Agreement provided for four different 
categories of claimants, three of which are relevant to this 
appeal:
6
 
 
Category I. – Claimants Who Paid an ETF 
(Other Than Category III or IV Class 
Members): 
A. Those Claimants who had a two-
year term contract and terminated within the 
first six months of that contract term [or (B.) 
had a one-year term contract and terminated 
within the first three months of that contract 
term], and show sufficient proof that they paid 
an ETF including signing under penalty of 
perjury,[
7
] shall be entitled to a payment of $25 
                                              
6
 Category III is entitled “Claimants Who Claim Their 
Wireless Term Contract(s) Including Amendments, Changes 
and/or Extensions to the Contract(s) or the Assessment or 
Potential Assessment of an ETF, or is [sic] Improper, Invalid, 
Unlawful or Otherwise Unenforceable For Any Reason 
Whatsoever.”  (AJA at 289.)  No one contends that the issues 
on appeal affect the Claimants who would have rights under 
Category III, and, by the terms of the category, we do not see 
that they would. 
7
 The Settlement Agreement defined an ETF as “any 
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from the Common Fund; or to the extent such 
Settlement Class Members desire to activate a 
new service line with Sprint Nextel: (i) a waiver 
of the approximately $36 activation fee 
normally charged by Sprint Nextel in 
connection with obtaining a new two-year 
contract to become a Sprint Nextel subscriber; 
and (ii) 100 free bonus minutes per month for 
the first year of that two-year contract. … 
 ….  
C. Those Claimants who had a two-
year term contract and terminated at any time 
between the seventh to the twenty fourth month 
of that contract term [or (D.) had a one-year 
term contract and terminated within the fourth 
to twelfth month of that contract term], and 
show sufficient proof that they paid an ETF 
including signing under penalty of perjury, shall 
be entitled to a payment of $90 from the 
Common Fund; or to the extent such Settlement 
Class Members desire to activate a new service 
line with Sprint Nextel: (i) a waiver of the 
approximately $36 activation fee normally 
charged by Sprint Nextel in connection with 
obtaining a new two-year contract to become a 
                                                                                                     
charge described, imposed, charged, or collected pursuant to a 
provision in a fixed-term subscriber agreement calling for the 
payment of a flat-rate amount for terminating the agreement 
prior to expiration of the agreement‟s specified term.”  (AJA 
at 267.) 
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Sprint Nextel subscriber; and (ii) 100 free bonus 
minutes per month for the first year of that two-
year contract. … 
    ….    
E. Those Claimants who cannot 
show sufficient proof that they paid an ETF, but 
sign under penalty of perjury that they paid an 
ETF will receive $25 cash payment; or to the 
extent such Settlement Class Members desire to 
activate a new service line with Sprint Nextel: 
(i) a waiver of the approximately $36 activation 
fee normally charged by Sprint Nextel in 
connection with obtaining a new two-year 
contract to become a Sprint Nextel subscriber; 
and (ii) 100 free bonus minutes per month for 
the first year of that two-year contract. … 
Category II. – Claimants Who Were Charged an 
ETF But Did Not Pay the ETF: 
 
A. Those Claimants who had a two-
year term contract and terminated within the 
first six months of that contract term [or (B.) 
had a one-year term contract and terminated 
within the first three months of that contract 
term], and show sufficient proof that were 
charged an ETF, including signing under 
penalty of perjury, shall be entitled to $25 in 
credit relief, if the debt owed to Sprint Nextel is 
still owned by Sprint Nextel; or to the extent 
such Settlement Class Members desire to 
activate a new service line with Sprint Nextel: 
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(i) a waiver of the approximately $36 activation 
fee normally charged by Sprint Nextel in 
connection with obtaining a new two-year 
contract to become a Sprint Nextel subscriber; 
and (ii) 100 free bonus minutes per month for 
the first year of that two-year contract. … 
 …. 
C. Those Claimants who had a term 
contract and terminated after the seventh month 
of a two year term or terminated after the fourth 
month of a one year term, and show sufficient 
proof that they were charged an ETF, including 
signing under penalty of perjury, shall be 
entitled to (i) a $90 credit, if the debt owed to 
Sprint Nextel is still owned by Sprint Nextel; or 
(ii) to the extent such Settlement Class 
Members desire to activate a new line of service 
with Sprint Nextel: (i) a waiver of the 
approximately $36 activation fee normally 
charged by Sprint Nextel [for] free activation in 
connection with obtaining a new two-year 
contract to become a Sprint Nextel subscriber; 
and (ii) 100 free bonus minutes per month for 
the first year of that two-year contract. … 
 …. 
Category IV. – Claimants Whose Claim  
Arises After Notice to The Class But Before  
January 1, 2011: 
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H. Any Claimant who has a wireless 
line of service under a term contract entered 
into before January 1, 2009 and is subject to a 
flat-rate ETF that terminates after the close of 
the notice period, whose Approved Claim arose 
after the notice for approval of Settlement is 
provided to the Settlement Class but before 
January 1, 2011, and who swears under penalty 
of perjury that they were harmed as a result of 
the flat-rate ETF will be entitled to either: (i) a 
Sprint Nextel prepaid 90 minute Long Distance 
Calling Card to be purchased out of the 
Common Fund; (ii) to the extent such 
Settlement Class Member desires to activate a 
new line of service with Sprint Nextel, a waiver 
of the approximately $36 activation fee 
normally charged by Sprint Nextel in 
connection with obtaining a new two-year 
contract to become a Sprint Nextel subscriber 
and 100 free bonus minutes per month for the 
first year of that two year contract; or (iii) 300 
free text messages per month for six months. … 
(Appellants‟ Joint Appendix (“AJA”) at 283-291.)   
 
The Settlement Agreement released Sprint from all 
ETF-related claims, including claims “arising from or relating 
to any decision by Sprint … to impose [or] collect … an 
Early Termination Fee, regardless of the basis for the 
customer‟s claim that the fee should or should not be imposed 
[or] collected.”  (AJA at 270.)  The Settlement Agreement 
defined the “Claim Period” – that is, the time frame in which 
eligible claimants are entitled to file a claim to acquire the 
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relief set forth in the Settlement Agreement – as “the period 
beginning 30 days after entry of the Preliminary Approval 
Order and ending 60 days after entry of the Final Approval 
Order and Judgment” related to the class settlement.  (AJA at 
263-64.)  However, “the Claim Period d[id] not apply to 
Category IV benefits [, as] the deadline for submitting a 
Category IV benefit Claim Form [was] January 1, 2011.”  
(AJA at 264.)    
 
B. Class Certification and Settlement Approval 
 
On December 8, 2008, the District Court entered an 
order preliminarily approving the Settlement Agreement and 
conditionally certifying the class under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(b)(3).
8
  The settlement class was defined as 
follows: 
 
All persons in the United States who are or 
were parties to a personal fixed-term subscriber 
agreement for a Sprint Nextel Wireless Service 
Account for personal or mixed 
business/personal use, whether on the Sprint 
CDMA network or Nextel iDen network, or 
both, excluding accounts for which the 
responsible party for the Wireless Service 
Account is a business, corporation or a 
governmental entity, entered into between July 
                                              
8
 Under Rule 23(b)(3), and assuming compliance with 
Rule 23(a), a court may certify a class when “questions of law 
or fact common to class members predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members.”  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23(b)(3).   
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1, 1999 and December 31, 2008 and whose 
claims relate in any way to an Early 
Termination Fee or use of an Early Termination 
Fee in a fixed-term subscriber agreement, 
and/or use or propriety of a fixed-term 
subscriber agreement whether the term was for 
the initial fixed-term subscriber agreement or 
subsequent extensions or renewals to the fixed-
term subscriber agreement for whatever reason 
and/or who were charged by or paid an Early 
Termination Fee to Sprint Nextel, excluding 
only the Ayyad Class Claims and Persons whose 
right to sue Sprint Nextel as a Settlement Class 
Member is otherwise barred by a prior 
settlement agreement and/or prior final 
adjudication on the merits.  The Settlement 
Class includes Persons who were subject to an 
ETF, whether or not they paid any portion of 
the ETF either to Sprint Nextel or to any outside 
collection agency or at all, and includes persons 
who are prosecuting excluded claims to the 
extent such persons have claims other than 
those expressly excluded. 
(AJA at 7-8 (internal footnote omitted).) 
 
After preliminarily approving the Settlement 
Agreement, the District Court set forth a schedule for the final 
approval process, including allowing class members to lodge 
objections to the class certification and the Settlement 
Agreement.   
 
 21 
 
1. Initial Fairness Hearing 
 
The District Court held an initial approval hearing (the 
“Initial Fairness Hearing”) over a four-day period in March of 
2009.  In papers filed prior to that hearing, the Galleguillos 
Objectors attacked many aspects of the adequacy of notice 
given to potential class members about the class action.  In 
particular, they complained about the efforts undertaken by 
Sprint to produce a class member list for use in providing 
individual notice to class members.
9
  Following that hearing, 
on April 30, 2009, the Court issued an opinion agreeing with 
the Galleguillos Objectors that the initial notice plan (“INP”) 
did not comply with Rule 23(c)(2), which requires “the best 
notice that is practicable … .”10  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).  
Accordingly, the Court issued an order denying final approval 
of the settlement without prejudice, and ordered counsel for 
the Class Representatives (“Class Counsel”) and Sprint to 
submit a new notice plan within 21 days.    
                                              
9
 Appellant Hall also objected to the settlement prior to 
the Initial Fairness Hearing, alleging that the Settlement 
Agreement was the product of a reverse auction.   “A „reverse 
auction‟ is generally „the practice whereby the defendant in a 
series of class actions picks the most ineffectual class lawyers 
to negotiate a settlement [with, in] the hope that the district 
court will approve a weak settlement that will preclude other 
claims against the defendant.‟”  (AJA at 31-32 (quoting In re 
Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 308 (3d Cir. 2005)).)  
That claim and another one – that class notice was deficient 
because the costs of notice and administrative expenses were 
to be paid from the Common Fund, see infra note 17 – were 
rejected by the Court.  See infra note 18. 
10
 More fully, Rule 23(c)(2)(B) provides, in relevant 
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In its opinion holding the INP deficient, the District 
Court instructed Sprint “to attempt to identify subclasses of 
individuals [who paid an ETF] and include individual notice 
to those persons.”  (AJA at 4264.)  The Court determined 
that, based on data provided by Sprint, it would be 
unreasonable for Sprint to compile a full list of class members 
from 1999-2008 because it would require six to twelve 
months of work at a cost of at least one million dollars.  
However, also based on records provided by Sprint, the Court 
found that “Sprint could conduct an inquiry as to whether … 
it can identify specific subsets of customers – whether by 
year, geographic region, ETF paid, or type of contract – that 
are members of the class,” and the Court concluded that, 
“therefore … the Galleguillos Objectors assert[ion] that 
partial class lists are as noticeable as complete ones … has 
merit.”  (AJA at 4260.) 
 
The District Court meticulously reviewed case law 
discussing what constitutes a reasonable effort at sending 
individual notice to class members, and it held that “Rule 
23(c)(2) [could not] be so easily circumvented by undertaking 
only an analysis of identifying each and every class member, 
                                                                                                     
part: 
For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the 
court must direct to class members the best 
notice that is practicable under the 
circumstances, including individual notice to all 
members who can be identified through 
reasonable effort.   
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 
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rather than some or most class members.”  (AJA at 4263.)  
Instead, the Court said that: 
 
Sprint must do more than it has done thus far … 
[because] those subclasses capable of 
reasonable identification require individual 
notice.  This especially holds true in a case such 
as this one, where those who paid an ETF are 
entitled to recover the lion‟s share of the 
settlement but are generally unlikely to be 
current Sprint customers.  
(AJA at 4264.)  The Court instructed Class Counsel and 
Sprint to construct a new notice plan that included, inter alia, 
“an indication from Sprint as to what subclasses of 
subscribers are reasonably identifiable and a corresponding 
plan to provide individual notice to those subscribers.”11  
(AJA at 4274.)  Because the Court “found notice to be 
insufficient,” it concluded that it “lack[ed] jurisdiction over 
                                              
11
 The Court also instructed that the new notice plan 
should include at least five other items: (1) “a new form of 
individual notice that contain[ed] the 23(c)(2) elements”; (2) 
“a plan to supply that notice to members of the Robertson 
class [a related litigation in California where Sprint had 
compiled a list of all members of a class that had paid flat-
rate ETFs]”; (3) “a plan to supply that individual notice to all 
current Sprint subscribers”; (4) “a new form of notice 
publication that is fully compliant with 23(c)(2) and 23(e)”; 
and (5) “a full publication plan that, in conjunction with 
individual notice, will provide the „best notice practicable.‟”  
(AJA at 4274-75.)    
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the absent class members,” and, “[u]ntil notice [was] properly 
administered,” it could not “evaluate the reasonableness of 
the settlement.”  (AJA at 4276.) 
 
2. Amended Notice Plan 
 
In response to the District Court‟s April 30, 2009 
opinion and order, Sprint and Class Counsel submitted a 
proposed Amended Notice Plan (“ANP”) on May 21, 2009.12  
Although it addressed several of the concerns that the Court 
had with the INP,
13
 the proposed ANP stated that it would be 
unreasonable to search any of Sprint‟s billing records to 
identify subclasses of individuals who had been charged a 
flat-rate ETF.  To support that contention, Sprint and Class 
Counsel attached as an exhibit to the proposed ANP a 
declaration from Sprint‟s Vice President of Customer Billing 
                                              
12
 The day before the ANP was submitted, the Court 
granted Sprint‟s and Class Counsel‟s motion for 
reconsideration regarding publication notice, finding the 
publication notice complied with Rule 23.  That order, 
however, specifically noted that the portions of the Court‟s 
April 30, 2009 opinion addressing lack of proper individual 
notice remained in effect.   
13
 Specifically, the proposed ANP included the 
following modifications from the INP: (1) a bill insert to send 
to its current customers which was Rule 23-compliant, at an 
estimated cost of $750,000;  (2) individual notice to 194,461 
subscribers of the Robertson class, at an estimated cost of 
$73,895; and (3) individual notice to approximately 90,000 
subscribers that it could identify without searching its billing 
records, at an estimated cost of approximately $34,623.  
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Services, Scott Rice (the “Rice Declaration”).  The Rice 
Declaration detailed the efforts that would be required to 
search Sprint‟s billing records for class members who were 
charged a flat-rate ETF.  Specifically, it noted that, “without 
unforeseen interruptions or data losses” (AJA at 5504), it 
would take one to two months to capture information for class 
members who were charged a flat-rate ETF between April 1, 
2009 and June 30, 2009, at an estimated cost of $20,000, and 
it would take four to five months to capture information for 
class members who were charged a flat-rate ETF between 
April 1, 2007 to March 31, 2009, at an estimated cost of 
$80,000.  Because, in the view of Sprint and Class Counsel, 
“such efforts would require an unreasonable amount of time 
at a substantial cost,” the ANP they proposed did not provide 
for any search of Sprint‟s billing records.14  (AJA at 4337.) 
 
Twelve days later, on June 2, 2009, the District Court 
entered an order approving the ANP.  The Court explained 
that it was “satisfied – upon examining [the Rice Declaration] 
– that it would be unreasonable to require Sprint to engage in 
further efforts to individually identify additional class 
members [because] [t]he time, cost, and effort associated with 
poring through and analyzing the various Sprint databases 
[were] not reasonable.”  (AJA at 4347.)  Therefore, the Court 
found “that individual notice, as outlined [in the ANP], [was] 
                                              
14
 Sprint and Class Counsel did note that “[i]f the 
Court believe[d] that it would be reasonable for Sprint to 
engage in any of the further efforts set forth in the Rice 
[Declaration], Sprint [was] willing to do so.  However, the 
dates for the final approval hearing and the exclusion and 
objection deadlines would have to be pushed out by at least a 
few months.”  (AJA at 4337 n.3.) 
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sufficient to satisfy Rule 23.”  (Id.)  The District Court set the 
second final approval hearing (the “Second Fairness 
Hearing”) for October 21, 2009, and set October 7, 2009 as 
the “[d]eadline for any member of the settlement class … to 
file specific objections to the settlement.”  (Id.) 
 
3. Second Fairness Hearing  
 
The Galleguillos Objectors submitted a brief on the 
October 7, 2009 deadline, arguing, among other things, that 
the ANP was inadequate under Rule 23(c)(2)(B) and that the 
Class Representatives themselves were inadequate to satisfy 
the requirements of Rule 23(a).
15
  With respect to the ANP, 
the Galleguillos Objectors said that Sprint wrongly failed to 
provide individual notice to 9.2 million reasonably 
identifiable class members who had been charged flat-rate 
ETFs between April 1, 2007 and June 30, 2009.  With respect 
to the Class Representatives, they asserted that the interests of 
class members who were current Sprint customers were not 
adequately protected because the Class Representatives 
“[had] no interest in stopping [the flat-rate ETF] charges 
                                              
15
 Rule 23(a) provides, in part, that, in order to certify a 
class, a court must find that “the representative parties will 
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).  Although the Galleguillos Objectors did 
not specifically cite to Rule 23(a) in their October 7 brief, 
they cited to a case, Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 
1988), that specifically discussed the proper inquiry that a 
court should make to determine whether class representatives 
are adequate under Rule 23(a)(4), see infra Part II.B, and they 
couched their claim as challenging various prerequisites of 
Rule 23(a) that they alleged were not satisfied.   
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because, as former customers, they [were] no longer subject 
to them.”  (AJA at 5554.)   
 
On October 14, Sprint submitted a memorandum in 
response to the objections related to the adequacy of notice.
16
  
It contended that the 9.2 million number cited by the 
Galleguillos Objectors was overstated because the Sprint 
document on which that number was based included flat-rate 
ETFs charged to government and corporate accounts as well 
as individual accounts.  Although Sprint acknowledged “that 
the number of Settlement Class Members who were charged 
an ETF could measure into the tens of millions,” and a search 
of its billing records “could result in the identification of 
millions of Settlement Class Members,” Sprint argued that the 
Court had already “properly concluded that the effort to 
identify [those] Settlement Class Members would not be 
reasonable.”  (AJA at 4706.)  On October 19, two days before 
the Second Fairness Hearing, the Galleguillos Objectors 
conceded that the 9.2 million number was overstated and 
submitted the testimony of an expert who examined Sprint‟s 
databases from the Ayyad case to provide a corrected 
estimate.  That expert indicated that, using “a widely 
available statistical software package” (AJA at 5625), he was 
able to quickly sort the data to find that 44.95% of the 
customers from those databases were individual accounts.  
Therefore, the Galleguillos Objectors revised their initial 
                                              
16
 That memorandum did not respond to the 
Galleguillos Objectors‟ contention that the Class 
Representatives could not adequately represent the interests 
of all class members.   
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figure of 9.2 million individual class members to 4.2 
million.
17
    
 
The Second Fairness Hearing went forward as 
scheduled on October 21, 2009.  
 
4. Order Approving Class Certification and 
 Settlement 
 
In an opinion dated January 15, 2010, the District 
Court overruled all objections,
18
 certified the proposed 
                                              
17
 Objector Hall also renewed her objection that the 
settlement was the product of a reverse auction.  Additionally, 
Hall claimed that the class notice was still deficient because 
Class Counsel and Sprint provided that the costs of notice and 
administrative expenses, including the ANP, were to be paid 
from the Common Fund, and Hall asserted that those costs 
should instead be borne by Sprint and/or Class Counsel.   
18
 The Court thus also overruled both of Hall‟s 
objections.  With regard to the reverse auction claim, the 
Court stated that it had been presented with no evidence of 
collusiveness “[a]side from the mere overlap of time when 
counsel for Jessica Hall and Class Counsel were apparently 
negotiating with Sprint.”  (AJA at 32.)  In contrast, the Court 
pointed out that “[the retired district judge], who oversaw five 
months of intense settlement negotiations, specifically 
dismissed the idea that the Settlement was the product of a 
reverse auction or collusion.”  (Id.)  Thus, the Court 
determined that the reverse auction claim was “baseless.”  
(Id.)  The Court then turned to Hall‟s argument that payment 
for additional notice should not come from the Common Fund 
but rather be borne by either Sprint or Class Counsel.  
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settlement class, and approved the Settlement Agreement.  
                                                                                                     
Though noting Hall‟s “objection [was] well taken,” the Court 
cited to the Settlement Agreement, which contemplated that 
“all costs” of providing notice would come out of the 
Common Fund.  (Id.)  The Court also cited to the ANP, which 
provided that Sprint and Class Counsel would seek 
reimbursement from the Common Fund for the re-notice 
costs.  Accordingly, the Court did not accept Hall‟s notice 
objection.    
Hall has raised those same two objections to us on 
appeal, re-framing her notice-related claim as an attack on the 
Court approving a settlement that was neither fair, reasonable, 
nor adequate, as required under Rule 23(e)(2).  See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 23(e)(2) (“If the propos[ed] [settlement] would bind 
class members, the court may approve it only after a hearing 
and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate.”).  We 
conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
rejecting Hall‟s first objection.  Regarding the reverse auction 
claim, as the District Court noted, Hall‟s assertion was 
directly contradicted by the retired district judge who oversaw 
five months of negotiation between the parties.  Concerning 
the attack as to the adequacy of the settlement, in evaluating 
whether the settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate, the 
District Court utilized the proper test by analyzing each of the 
nine factors as laid out in Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 
(3d Cir. 1975).  After such analysis, it determined that the 
settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate.  Because notice 
issues remain to be resolved and because we also question 
whether the Class Representatives were adequate under Rule 
23(a)(4), see infra Part II.B, we make no comment on 
whether the settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate. 
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Regarding adequacy of representation under Rule 23(a)(4), 
the District Court stated that two factors must be considered: 
“(1) the plaintiff‟s attorney must be qualified, experienced, 
and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation, and (2) 
the plaintiff must not have interests antagonistic to those of 
the class.”  (AJA at 10-11 (quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co. 
of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450, 519 (D.N.J. 
1997)).)  The Court noted that “[n]o objection has been 
lodged specifically as to the qualification and capabilities of 
Class Counsel,” and it also determined that the “interests [of 
the Class Representatives] [were] not antagonistic to those of 
other members of the Class.”  (AJA at 11.)  Acknowledging 
the Galleguillos Objectors‟ contention that the Class 
Representatives were not adequate because none of them 
were current subscribers subject to a flat-rate ETF and thus 
did not negotiate or attempt to enjoin Sprint from enforcing 
its flat-rate ETF against current customers, the Court said 
that, if current subscribers who were subject to a flat-rate ETF 
were “otherwise harmed because of the existence of the flat-
rate ETF, such Class members would fall into Category IV … 
and would be entitled to the relief afforded therein.”19  (AJA 
                                              
19
 The District Court made that remark after 
specifically referring to a group known as the California 
Subscriber Class Claims, class members that were Sprint 
customers who “[had] not allege[d] that they had been 
charged and/or paid an ETF, but instead alleged simply that 
they were subject to an ETF in their subscriber agreement.”  
(AJA at 12.)  For purposes of relief afforded under the 
Settlement Agreement, the members of the California 
Subscriber Class were in the same position as all class 
members who were current customers and still subject to a 
flat-rate ETF and had not been charged a flat-rate ETF. 
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at 12.)   The Court further noted that the type of injunctive 
relief that the Galleguillos Objectors sought – allowing 
current subscribers to terminate without paying a flat-rate 
ETF – “could potentially expose such Class members to a 
counterclaim for damages from Sprint.”20  (AJA at 12 (citing 
Garrett v. Coast & S. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 511 P.2d 1197, 
1203-04 (Cal.1973)) (“We do not hold herein that merely 
because the late charge provision is void and thus cannot be 
used in determining the lender‟s damages, the borrower 
escapes unscathed.  He remains liable for the actual damages 
resulting from his default.”).)   
 
The District Court then addressed the Galleguillos 
Objectors‟ notice-related claims.  Concerning the reach of 
individual notice, the District Court rejected the contention 
that Sprint failed to provide notice to 9.2 million identifiable 
class members.
21
  The Court said that the “crux” of that 
                                                                                                     
Accordingly, we assume the Court‟s analysis here was meant 
to apply to all class members that were current Sprint 
subscribers. 
20
 That statement was also made in the context of 
referring to the California Subscriber Class Claims, and we 
make the same inference here as stated in note 19, supra. 
21
 The District Court noted that the “Galleguillos 
Objectors now concede that the 9.2 million figure [was], at 
the very least, based on outdated data and therefore 
unreliable.”  (AJA at 22.)  The Court did not mention that the 
Galleguillos Objectors submitted a revised estimate of 4.2 
million class members.  In a footnote, the Court pointed out 
that the Galleguillos Objectors “made no effort to obtain 
additional data” from Sprint or Class Counsel until two weeks 
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objection was “that Sprint could have identified millions of 
additional class members through Sprint‟s own billing 
records.”  (AJA at 22.)  The response was that “[e]ven if such 
speculation were correct, the Court ha[d] already examined 
the Rice Declaration and found that the time, cost and effort 
necessary to do so … would be unreasonable in light of all 
the circumstances.”22  (Id.) 
 
The Court concluded that it was “satisfied that it would 
be unreasonable to require Sprint to engage in further efforts 
to identify class members beyond” the approximately 285,000 
additional individuals who received individual notice of the 
settlement for the first time through the ANP.  (AJA at 26.)  
The Court noted that, just prior to the ANP, only 12,501 
claim forms for 19,105 lines of service had been submitted.  
Since the implementation of the ANP, however, an additional 
44,408 claim forms for 66,913 lines of service had been 
                                                                                                     
before the Second Fairness Hearing, and the Court was not 
aware of such matters until less than a week before the 
Second Fairness Hearing.  (AJA at 22 n.15.)  “As a result, 
their belated efforts to obtain such data were denied by the 
Court as untimely.”  (Id.)   
22
 The District Court also emphasized that, after Sprint 
and Class Counsel proposed the ANP on May 21, 2009, the 
Court received no opposition to it prior to approving the plan 
on June 2, 2009.  Similarly, the Court rejected the 
Galleguillos Objectors‟ claim that the Rice Declaration was 
inadmissible, reasoning that that claim was waived because 
no action was taken on that objection until October 7, 2009, 
the deadline to file objections, over four months after the 
Court had approved the ANP.     
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submitted.  Because the Court viewed the notice plan as 
“robust, thorough, and includ[ing] all of the essential 
elements to properly apprise absent Class members of their 
rights,” it concluded that the “parties ha[d] now fully 
complied with the stringent requirements set forth by Rules 
23(c)(2)(B) and 23(e).”23  (AJA at 26-27.) 
 
The Court entered a final order certifying the proposed 
settlement class under Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3) and granting 
final approval to the Settlement Agreement.  Appellants then 
timely filed the present appeals. 
 
II. Discussion24 
 
The Galleguillos Objectors renew on appeal many of 
the objections they made before the District Court, asserting, 
among other things, that the District Court abused its 
discretion by finding that it would be unreasonable to require 
Sprint to perform any search of its billing records to provide 
individual notice to class members who had been charged a 
flat-rate ETF, and that the Court further abused its discretion 
by holding that the Class Representatives were adequate.  Our 
                                              
23
 After that analysis, the District Court analyzed the 
nine Girsh factors, see supra note 18, to evaluate whether the 
settlement was “fair, reasonable, and adequate” under Rule 
23(e)(2), and determined that it was so.  The Court also 
approved the attorneys‟ fee award, as well as addressed the 
allocation of that award.   
24
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d), and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
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disposition of these appeals focuses on the first of those 
issues, though we think the second warrants comment as well. 
 
 As the framing of the objectors‟ arguments indicates, 
we review a district court‟s decision to certify a class and 
approve a settlement for an abuse of discretion.  In re Pet 
Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(citation omitted).  An abuse exists “where the district court‟s 
decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an 
errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to 
fact.”  Id.  (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
A. Billing Records Search 
 
The Rice Declaration was the sole basis on which the 
District Court determined that it would be unreasonable for 
Sprint to search its billing records to identify class members 
who had been charged a flat-rate ETF.  Even accepting the 
contents of the Rice Declaration,
25
 the Galleguillos Objectors 
                                              
25
 The Galleguillos Objectors also challenge the 
District Court‟s ruling that their objections to the Rice 
Declaration were waived because that objection was not made 
in a timely manner.  The Galleguillos Objectors had alleged 
that the Rice Declaration was inadmissible under Federal 
Rules of Evidence 601, 602, 701, 702, and 802.  Sprint and 
the Class Representatives argue that the Court properly 
determined the objections to the Rice Declaration were 
waived because the Galleguillos Objectors did not object until 
October 7, 2009, more than four months after the ANP‟s June 
2, 2009 implementation.  The Galleguillos Objectors respond 
that they filed the objection by the October 7, 2009 deadline 
set in the District Court‟s order implementing the ANP.  
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claim that the District Court failed to properly exercise its 
discretion when it determined that it would be unreasonable 
to require any such search of those records for the purpose of 
providing individual notice to those class members.  We 
agree.   
 
The Rice Declaration estimated that, to capture contact 
information for class members who were charged a flat-rate 
ETF between April 1, 2007 and June 30, 2009, a search 
would take approximately four to five months at an estimated 
cost of $100,000.
26
   Sprint candidly acknowledged before the 
District Court, and likewise represents to us,
27
 that the search 
                                                                                                     
Moreover, they argue that there was no prior deadline to 
adhere to since the proposed ANP had not been heard on a 
noticed motion, and thus there was no briefing schedule 
setting the date by which the District Court expected a 
response.  Furthermore, they contend that the 12 days 
between the filing of the Rice Declaration and the order 
approving the ANP was not an adequate amount of time to 
respond.  Without deciding the matter, we accept for purposes 
of this opinion that the Rice Declaration was admissible.    
26
 Specifically, the Rice Declaration estimated that it 
would take one to two months to acquire information for class 
members who were charged a flat-rate ETF between April 1, 
2009 and June 30, 2009 at a cost of approximately $20,000, 
and four to five months to obtain that information for class 
members who were charged a flat-rate ETF between April 1, 
2007 and March 31, 2009 at a cost of about $80,000.  See 
supra Part I.B.2. 
27
 Class Counsel, on behalf of the Class 
Representatives, filed a letter indicating that the Class 
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efforts described in the Rice Declaration could result in the 
identification of millions of class members.  After examining 
the Rice Declaration, however, the District Court, both in its 
order approving the ANP and in its opinion approving the 
final settlement, concluded that it would be unreasonable for 
Sprint to undertake the search of its billing records because of 
the “time, cost and effort necessary to do so.” (AJA at 22; see 
also AJA at 4347 (“The time, cost, and effort associated with 
poring through and analyzing the various Sprint databases are 
not reasonable… .”).)  Given the requirements of Rule 23(c) 
and of our precedents, and in light of the record before the 
District Court, that decision cannot stand. 
 
As noted earlier, Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requires “individual 
notice to all members who can be identified through 
reasonable effort.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).  The Supreme 
Court discussed what constitutes “reasonable effort” in Eisen 
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, which involved a prospective class 
consisting of nearly six million individuals who had engaged 
in odd-lot stock purchases.  417 U.S. 156, 166  (1974).  The 
district court in that case had noted that at least two million of 
those individuals could be identified by names and addresses 
“[b]y comparing the records and tapes of the odd-lot firms 
with the wire firm tapes which contain the name and address 
of each customer,” Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 
                                                                                                     
Representatives join the arguments made by Sprint in Sprint‟s 
brief responding to the claims made by the Galleguillos 
Objectors in their opening brief.  Thus, when we refer 
hereinafter to arguments made by Sprint in response to the 
opening brief filed by the Galleguillos Objectors, it should be 
understood that such arguments are also advanced by the 
Class Representatives. 
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253, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev’d, 479 F.2d 1005, 1020 (2d 
Cir. 1973), aff’d, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), and that “an additional 
250,000 persons who had participated in special investment 
programs involving odd-lot trading” could also be reasonably 
identified, 417 U.S. at 166-67.  Including the price of first 
class postage, the district court determined that individual 
notice to all identifiable class members would cost $225,000.  
Id. at 167.  It held, however, that such a substantial 
expenditure was not required at the outset of the litigation, 
and ordered limited individual notice, 90% of the cost to be 
paid by petitioner.  Id.  The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that Rule 23(c)(2) 
required individual notice to all identifiable class members, 
with the entire cost to be paid by petitioner as the 
representative plaintiff.  Id. at 169.   
 
The Supreme Court agreed with the Second Circuit 
and said that “the names and addresses of 2,250,000 class 
members [were] easily ascertainable, and there [was] nothing 
to show that individual notice [could not] be mailed to each.”  
Id. at 175.  The Court expressly rejected petitioner‟s argument 
that the requirement of individual notice should be 
“dispense[d] with … in this case … [because of] the 
prohibitively high cost of providing individual notice to 
2,250,000 class members.”  Id.  As the Court put it, 
“individual notice to identifiable class members is not a 
discretionary consideration to be waived in a particular case.  
It is, rather, an unambiguous requirement of Rule 23. …  
Accordingly, each class member who can be identified 
through reasonable effort must be notified… .”  Id. at 176.  
The Court noted that “[t]here is nothing in Rule 23 to suggest 
that the notice requirements can be tailored to fit the 
pocketbooks of particular plaintiffs.”  Id.  And the Court also 
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stated that notice by publication “had long been recognized as 
a poor substitute for actual notice.”  Id. at 175 (citation 
omitted).  Thus, Eisen stands for the proposition that 
individual notice must be delivered to class members who can 
be reasonably identified, and that the costs required to 
actually deliver notice should not easily cause a court to 
permit the less satisfactory substitute of notice by publication. 
 
In Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, the Supreme 
Court again had occasion to consider the individual notice 
requirement.  437 U.S. 340 (1978).  To identify class 
members in Oppenheimer Fund, the representative plaintiffs 
sought to require the defendants, an investment fund, its 
management corporation, and a brokerage firm, to help 
compile a list of names and addresses of class members from 
records kept by the transfer agent for one of the defendants, 
so that the individual notice required by Rule 23(c)(2) could 
be sent.  437 U.S. at 342.  The class was estimated to include 
approximately 121,000 persons.  Id. at 344-45.  The transfer 
agent‟s employees testified that: 
 
[I]n order to compile a list of the class 
members‟ names and addresses, they would 
have to sort manually through a considerable 
volume of paper records, keypunch between 
150,000 and 300,000 computer cards, and 
create eight new computer programs for use 
with records kept on computer tapes that either 
[were] in existence or would have to be created 
from the paper records. 
 39 
 
Id. at 345.  “The cost of [those] operations was estimated in 
1973 to exceed $16,000.”28  Id.  Having learned of the cost 
and efforts required, the representative plaintiffs sought to 
redefine the class to include only persons who had bought 
fund shares during a specific time period and still held shares 
in the fund, so that individual notice could be sent in one of 
the fund‟s periodic mailings to its current shareholders.  Id.  
That redefinition would have had the effect of excluding 
individual notice to 18,000 former fund shareholders who 
were class members, and reaching 68,000 current 
shareholders who were not class members.  Id.  The district 
court rejected the proposed redefinition because it arbitrarily 
reduced individual notice to the class.  Id. at 346.  The district 
court explained that “it [was] the responsibility of defendants 
to cull out from their records a list of all class members and 
provide [that] list to plaintiffs.”  Id. (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).   The district court also held that 
the cost of that endeavor was “the responsibility of [the] 
defendants,” though it did note that the representative 
plaintiffs would “then have the responsibility to prepare the 
necessary notice and mail it at their expense.”  Id. (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
                                              
28
 When the Galleguillos Objectors provided the 
District Court with the revised 4.2 million estimate of class 
members that could be identified through Sprint‟s billing 
records, they noted that, using the inflation calculator on the 
United States Department of Labor website, the cost incurred 
to identify the 121,000 class members in Oppenheimer Fund 
would be approximately $80,000 in 2009 dollars.  Those 
search efforts amounted to approximately 13 cents per class 
member using 1973 dollars, or approximately 64 cents per 
class member in 2009 dollars, adjusting for inflation.   
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The Second Circuit, en banc, affirmed, id. at 347-48, 
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the underlying 
cost-allocation problem, id. at 349.  Although the Supreme 
Court held that the district court abused its discretion in 
requiring defendants to bear the expenses of identifying the 
class members,
29
 the Court affirmed, sub silentio, the decision 
requiring the additional search efforts.  Id. at 364.  In 
particular, the Supreme Court concluded that the “information 
[from the transfer agent] must be obtained to comply with the 
[representative plaintiffs‟] obligation to provide notice to their 
class.”  Id. 
 
In the course of discussing the underlying cost-
allocation issue, the Oppenheimer Fund court relied heavily 
on the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit in In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 
552 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1977).  See Oppenheimer Fund, 437 
U.S. at 355-60.  The Fifth Circuit there discussed Rule 
23(c)(2)‟s individual notice requirement in the context of 
identifying a class of original retail purchasers of 371,000 
new Datsun cars.  The plaintiffs in Nissan had argued to the 
district court that the defendants, including Nissan Motor 
Corp. and every Datsun dealer nationwide, were “obligated to 
conduct and bear the costs of” an examination of 1.7 million 
Retail Delivery Report (“RDR”) cards that recorded sales of 
new Datsun motor vehicles between 1966 and 1975 so that 
                                              
29
 The Supreme Court reached that conclusion because 
the plaintiffs could obtain the information by paying the 
transfer agent the same amount that the defendants would 
have to pay and that no special circumstances existed that 
warranted requiring the defendants to bear the expense.  Id. at 
363-64. 
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individual notice could be sent to class members.  552 F.2d at 
1094.  The district court instead only ordered the defendants, 
at their own expense, to prepare and submit a computer listing 
containing the names and addresses of currently registered 
Datsun owners, id., “characterize[ing] the examination of the 
1,700,000 RDR cards to extract the class members‟ names 
and addresses as an „herculean task‟ and an „unnecessarily 
time consuming and burdensome process,‟” id. at 1096.   
 
The Fifth Circuit, however, vacated the district court‟s 
class notice order, explaining: 
 
The source or sources providing the greatest 
number of names and addresses must be used.  
Obviously, the word “reasonable” cannot be 
ignored.  In every case, reasonableness is a 
function of anticipated results, costs, and 
amount involved.  A burdensome search 
through records that may prove not to contain 
any of the information sought clearly should not 
be required.  On the other hand, a search, even 
though calculated to reveal partial information 
or identification, may be omitted only if its cost 
will exceed the anticipated benefits.  Here, we 
know that the RDR cards provide the court with 
the best available listing of the names and 
addresses of all class members.  Indeed, the 
parties agree on this.  They only shy from 
undertaking the effort.  While the search cannot 
be made with push-button ease, its advantages 
bring the effort required within the range of 
reasonableness. 
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Id. at 1098-99.  The Nissan court then expounded on 
reasonableness: 
 
When the chore of examining defendants‟ RDR 
cards is juxtaposed to the efforts required to 
identify the … class members [in Eisen v. 
Carlisle & Jacquelin], it pales by comparison.  
The district court‟s characterization of the 
undertaking here as “herculean” is accurate only 
in relation to the class‟s size.  The key, though, 
is reasonable effort, and a large class requires a 
large effort.  Subdivision (c)(2) mandates that 
each class member be given the “best notice 
practicable under the circumstances.”  While 
the mechanical process of examining the cards 
may prove to be expensive and time-
consuming, the individual right of absentee 
class members to due process makes the cost 
and effort reasonable.   
Id. at 1100.  Such effort was required because “[a]bsentee 
class members … generally have … no knowledge of the suit 
until they receive initial class notice [,and individual notice] 
will be their primary, if not exclusive, source of information 
for deciding how to exercise their rights under [R]ule 23.”  Id. 
at 1104.  Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit ordered the district 
court “to require individual notice to the class based on the 
information available on the RDR cards.”  Id. at 1100.    
 
We have been similarly stringent in enforcing the 
individual notice requirement.  In Greenfield v. Villager 
Industries, Inc., we vacated a district court‟s order approving 
a settlement because no effort was made to identify class 
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members from the defendant‟s stock transfer records for the 
purpose of giving individual notice; rather, only publication 
notice was used.  483 F.2d 824, 834 (3d Cir. 1973).  We said 
that “a procedure such as the class action, which has a 
formidable, if not irretrievable, effect on substantive rights, 
can comport with constitutional standards of due process only 
if there is a maximum opportunity for notice to the absentee 
class member… .”  Id. at 831.  Citing Supreme Court 
precedent, we noted that publication notice “failed to satisfy 
due process requirements since „… it [was] not reasonably 
calculated to reach those who could be informed by other 
means at hand.‟”  Id. at 832 (quoting Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950)).  We 
explained that, “[w]here names and addresses of members of 
the class are easily ascertainable, … due process would 
dictate that the „best notice practicable under the 
circumstances …‟ would be individual notice.”  Id. at 832 
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)).  Our holding, based on 
Eisen, was straightforward: “„[a]ctual notice must be given to 
those whose identity could be ascertained with reasonable 
effort.‟”  Id. (quoting Eisen, 479 F.2d at 1009, aff’d 417 U.S. 
156).  We also said that it was “[t]he ultimate responsibility” 
of the district court to ensure that the parties complied with 
notice requirements because “the district court [is] … the 
guardian of the rights of the absentees.”  Id. 
 
Those cases notwithstanding, Sprint cites a decision 
from the Northern District of Georgia, In re Domestic Air 
Transportation Antitrust Litigation, to support its claim that it 
would be unreasonable to require it to search its billing 
records so that individual notice can be sent to more people.  
141 F.R.D. 534 (N.D. Ga. 1992).  Domestic Air involved a 
class action on behalf of purchasers of “domestic airline 
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passenger tickets from one or more of the defendant airlines 
… to and/or from a defendant‟s hub.”  Id. at 537.  Initially, 
the defendants had argued to the Court that class members 
could not be identified from the airlines‟ records for the 
purposes of compiling a list to provide those members with 
individual notice.  Id. at 539.  After the Court certified the 
class, an evidentiary hearing was held regarding “the 
proposed content, timing, and method of notice.”  Id. at 538.  
At that hearing, the plaintiffs agreed with the defendants‟ 
initial position “that class members … [could not] be 
identified with reasonable effort and thus there [was] no list 
of class members to which mandatory individual notice 
[could] be given.”  Id.  The defendants, however, in an abrupt 
“about face,” id. at 540, then “insist[ed] that it [was] possible 
to identify a partial list of class members, and plaintiffs must, 
therefore, individually notify persons on the partial list,” id. at 
538.  In support, the defendants said they had developed a list 
containing more than 9.3 million names and addresses of 
possible class members.  Id. at 541.   
 
The district court took a different view.  It determined 
that the list developed by the defendants was not a list of class 
members, and it found “as a fact that class members [could 
not] be identified at [that] time through reasonable effort.”  
Id. at 541.  As the district court saw it, the defendants‟ list 
was both over-inclusive and under-inclusive, and it was thus 
“„impossible to estimate how many absentee class members 
would receive individual notice.‟”  Id. at 545 (quoting Nissan, 
552 F.2d at 1099).  Cautioning that “„reasonableness is a 
function of anticipated results, costs, and amounts involved,‟” 
id. at 547 (quoting Nissan, 552 F.2d at 1099), the court 
concluded that  
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this [was] not the classic case where Rule 
23(c)(2) individual notice [was] mandated.  In 
cases such as Eisen and Nissan the records kept 
by the defendants indisputably contained the 
names and addresses of the universe of class 
members. … Because the [list at issue in 
Domestic Air] [was] not a list of class members, 
there [was] no way to assure that notice to the 
list would definitely result in notice to a 
substantial number of class members. 
Id. at 546.  Thus, the district court did “not direct individual 
mail notice … to the … list.”  Id.   
 
The decision in Domestic Air is no support for Sprint 
here.  On the contrary, as the District Court in this action had 
initially noted in its order holding the INP deficient, 
“Domestic Air does not stand for the proposition that partial 
class lists do not require individual notice; rather, it adopted 
quite the opposite formulation.  Partial lists – to the extent 
they are accurate – would require 23(c)(2)-compliant notice.”  
(AJA at 4262.)  After relying on both Eisen, (see AJA at 4263 
(“Given that Eisen required notice to a partial class and that it 
pronounced constructive notice to be especially unreliable, 
this Court is hard-pressed to find Sprint‟s arguments 
persuasive.”)), and Nissan, (see AJA at 4263 (“Nor does the 
fact that a large effort is required to identify a subset of class 
members automatically render individual notice 
inapplicable.” (citing Nissan, 552 F.2d at 1100))), the District 
Court found  
 
that Sprint must do more than it ha[d] done so 
far.  The fact that not every member of the class 
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can receive the best notice does not mean that 
everyone gets the least notice.  Rather, those 
subclasses capable of reasonable identification 
require individual notice.  This especially holds 
true in a case such as this one, where those who 
paid an ETF are entitled to recover the lion’s 
share of the settlement but are generally 
unlikely to be current Sprint customers.  Sprint 
shall attempt to identify subclasses of 
individuals and include individual notice to 
those persons. 
(AJA at 4264 (emphasis added).)   
 
Despite that well-grounded and thoroughly persuasive 
conclusion, the District Court, much like the defendants in 
Domestic Air, did something of an about face when it 
approved the ANP proposed by Sprint and Class Counsel.  
Other than a general reference to the Rice Declaration for the 
proposition that the “time, cost, and effort necessary to 
[conduct a partial search of its billing records to provide 
individual notice to a subset of class members who were 
charged ETFs] … would be unreasonable in light of all the 
circumstances” (AJA at 22), the Court did not provide any 
support for its new and very different determination that 
Sprint did not need to conduct a search of its billing records 
to provide individual notice to a larger group of class 
members.  This is particularly puzzling given that the District 
Court had said, in its order holding the INP deficient, that 
“Sprint can run targeted searches that pull relevant 
information for sub-classes of individuals.” (AJA at 4260 
(emphasis added).)   
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Viewing “reasonableness [as] a function of anticipated 
results, costs, and amount involved,” Nissan, 552 F.2d at 
1099, the District Court‟s changed determination, based 
solely on the Rice Declaration, that it would be unreasonable 
for Sprint to undertake any search of its own billing records 
was “an errant conclusion of law or an improper application 
of law to fact.”  In re Pet Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 
at 341 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
Similar to Eisen, where at least 2.25 million class members 
could have been identified by names and addresses, Sprint 
has acknowledged here that the database search outlined in 
the Rice Declaration “could result in the identification of 
millions of Settlement Class Members.”30  (AJA at 4706.)  
The cost of identifying those “millions” of class members is 
approximately $100,000.  If only two million people were 
identified through that billing records search, the search 
would have cost approximately 5 cents per class member 
identified in 2009.  Including the expense of mailing the 
individual notice, the cost would have been approximately 43 
cents per class member.
31
  Given the size of the class and the 
                                              
30
 Sprint confirmed that fact in both its brief, (see 
Sprint‟s Br. at 37 n.20 (stating “[a]t the time the District 
Court conducted its analysis, the record was clear that the 
efforts that Sprint described in the Rice Declaration could 
result in the identification of millions of class members (albeit 
at an unreasonable expenditure of time, effort and money)”)), 
and at oral argument, (see Oral Argument Transcript (“Tr.”) 
26:18-20 (answering that it was “without question” that there 
were “potentially millions of class members in” the billing 
database)). 
31
 Using the 4.2 million estimate given by the 
Galleguillos Objectors, the search would have cost less than 
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due process rights at stake, these are not troublingly high 
sums. 
 
Even if the costs had been higher, however, that would 
not automatically mean they were unreasonable.  Eisen 
expressly rejected the argument that costs are the primary 
driver in the judgment on notice, because “individual notice 
to identifiable class members is not a discretionary 
consideration to be waived in a particular case.  It is, rather, 
an unambiguous requirement of Rule 23 … .”  417 U.S. at 
176.  Here, the costs per class member were projected to be 
less than the per-member cost for individual notice in both 
Eisen and Oppenheimer Fund, after adjusting for inflation.
32
   
                                                                                                     
2.5 cents per class member.  If, however, there were actually 
4.2 million class members that were identified, that would, of 
course, increase the cost of mailing notice to those 
individuals.  Assuming that the cost of mailing postcard 
notice was 38 cents per postcard, which was the estimate used 
to determine the cost of the mailing to the Robertson class in 
the ANP, it would have cost approximately $1.6 million to 
mail 4.2 million postcards in 2009.  At oral argument, 
however, counsel for Sprint conceded that mailing expenses 
ought not be factored into the analysis if it is known how 
many class members are identifiable.  (See Tr. 29:6-8 (“I 
understand you can‟t [object to] expenses when it comes to 
the mailing.  If they‟re identifiable, they‟ve got to be mailed 
to.  I get that.”).) 
32
 Excluding mailing expenses, the cost of identifying 
contact information and preparing the individual notice forms 
for the 2.25 million class members in Eisen in 1971 was 
$90,000.  See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 167 (noting that, including 
the postage rate of six cents, the expense of stuffing and 
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Sprint refers to the “cumbersome process required to 
search its vast data environments” (Sprint‟s Br. at 35) and 
argues that “[e]ven assuming that the efforts outlined in the 
Rice Declaration would yield 4.2 million … [c]lass members, 
it is simply another way of restating the already known [fact 
that,] with significant effort, a large number of … [c]lass 
members could be identified,” (Sprint‟s Br. at 37-38).  
Instead, Sprint asserts that “[t]he question before the District 
Court … was whether that effort was reasonable,” and “the 
Court reviewed the efforts outlined in the Rice Declaration 
and determined, within its sound discretion, that it would be 
unreasonable to have Sprint undertake those efforts.”  
(Sprint‟s Br. at 38.)  But, if the efforts detailed in the Rice 
Declaration, whereby a computer program would have to run 
search queries in certain databases, would identify 4.2 million 
class members, we fail to see why running those search 
inquiries is unreasonable, and no explanation for that 
conclusion was provided by the District Court.  In fact, the 
effort that would be required here seems less significant than 
the efforts required in Eisen, 52 F.R.D. at 257 (identifying at 
least two million individuals “[b]y comparing the records and 
tapes of the odd-lot firms with the wire firm tapes which 
contain the name and address of each customer”), or in 
                                                                                                     
mailing the 2.25 million notice forms would cost $225,000).  
After adjusting for inflation, that cost would have been 
approximately $477,000 in 2009, or 21 cents per class 
member.  See Dep‟t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI 
Inflation Calculator, 
http://bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm.  The cost of the 
efforts to compile the list required in Oppenheimer Fund, 
excluding mailing expenses, was approximately 64 cents per 
class member in 2009 dollars.  See supra note 28.   
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Oppenheimer Fund, 437 U.S. at 345 (requiring transfer 
agent‟s employees to “sort manually through a considerable 
volume of paper records, keypunch between 150,000 and 
300,000 computer cards, and create eight new computer 
programs for use with records kept on computer tapes that 
either [were] in existence or would have to be created from 
the paper records.”), or in Nissan, 552 F.2d at 1094, 1096 
(undertaking examination of 1.7 million RDR cards to 
identify names and addresses of 371,000 original retail 
purchasers, an examination that the district court called 
“herculean” and “unnecessarily time consuming and 
burdensome”).   
 
As did the parties in Nissan, it appears that Sprint and 
the Class Representatives would agree that the search of the 
billing records would “provide … the best available listing of 
the names and addresses of … class members [who were 
charged ETFs]. …  They only shy away from undertaking the 
effort.”  Id. at 1099.  While it may be that a search of the 
billing records to find class members who have been charged 
flat-rate ETFs “cannot be made with push-button ease,” “its 
advantages,” based on the admissions made by Sprint itself, 
appear likely to “bring the effort required within the range of 
reasonableness.”  Id.  Because we have no way of knowing 
what in the Rice Declaration caused the District Court to 
change its mind about the need for a search of the billing 
records, “the individual right of absentee class members to 
due process” under Rule 23(c)(2) may have been violated.  Id. 
at 1100.  In light of the principles outlined in Eisen, 
Oppenheimer Fund, and Nissan, and our own precedent 
calling for “a maximum opportunity for notice to the absentee 
class member,” Greenfield, 483 F.2d at 831; see Girsh v. 
Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 1975) (noting our 
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“Circuit‟s strong policy in favor of „maximum notice‟”), the 
District Court needs to do more to fulfill its duty as “the 
guardian of the rights of the absentees” to ensure that the 
parties complied with the individual notice requirement of 
Rule 23(c)(2), Greenfield, 483 F.2d at 832.   
 
We will therefore remand to the District Court to again 
assess whether the ANP passes muster under Rule 23(c)(2).  
Given Sprint‟s concession that a billing records search could 
result in identifying millions of class members who were 
charged a flat-rate ETF – individuals who are in the sweet 
spot of the proposed class – we are not sure how it can be said 
that it is unreasonable for Sprint to search any of its billing 
records, but we leave that determination to the District Court, 
to be made on a more complete record and with a fuller 
explanation.  In that connection, we note the availability of 
statistical sampling of Sprint‟s billing records as a means to 
provide the District Court with a better grounded estimate of 
the number of class members who could, through a search of 
those records, be identified during the relevant period.
33
  
                                              
33
 Guidelines in the electronic discovery realm that 
contemplate statistical sampling to assist in the cost-benefit 
analysis required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(b)(2)(C)(iii) may also help determine what is a 
“reasonable effort” in the class action context under Rule 
23(c)(2).  In assessing whether to limit discovery, a court may 
be required to consider whether “the burden or expense of the 
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering 
the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties‟ 
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, 
and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).  One of the Sedona 
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Conference Principles of Proportionality, a set of guidelines 
that offer a framework for the best electronic discovery 
practices, provides that “[e]xtrinsic information and sampling 
may assist in the analysis of whether requested discovery is 
sufficiently important to warrant the potential burden or 
expense of its production.”  The Sedona Conference® WG1, 
The Sedona Conference® Commentary on Proportionality in 
Electronic Discovery 291 (“Sedona Commentary”) (2010), 
available at 
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/Propo
rtionality2010.pdf.  The commentary to that principle 
provides as follows: 
When asked to limit discovery on the basis of 
burden or expense, courts must make an 
assessment of the importance of the information 
sought.  Discovery should be limited if the 
burden or expense of producing the requested 
information is disproportionate to its 
importance to the litigation.  Performing such 
an assessment can be challenging, given that it 
may be impossible to review the content of the 
requested information until it is produced.   
In some cases, it may be clear that the 
information requested is important – perhaps 
even outcome-determinative.  In other cases, 
courts order sampling of the requested 
information, consider extrinsic evidence, or 
both, to determine whether the requested 
information is sufficiently important to warrant 
potentially burdensome or expensive discovery. 
Sedona Commentary 299 (internal footnote omitted); see 
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Once that estimate is made, the Court, weighing the 
“anticipated results, costs, and amount involved,” Nissan 552 
F.2d at 1099, should be able to determine whether a full 
search of the subject period would be reasonable, especially 
in light of the fact that the class members who were charged a 
flat-rate ETF were the ones who were “entitled to recover the 
lion‟s share of the settlement” (AJA at 4264) but were 
unlikely to otherwise know of it.  See Nissan, 552 F.2d at 
1104 (“Absentee class members will generally have had no 
knowledge of [a] suit until they receive the initial class notice 
[,which] will be their primary, if not exclusive, source of 
information… .”). 
 
                                                                                                     
Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) 
(“[T]he parties may need some focused discovery, which may 
include sampling of the sources, to learn more about what 
burdens and costs are involved in accessing the information, 
what the information consists of, and how valuable it is for 
the litigation in light of information that can be obtained by 
exhausting other opportunities for discovery.”). 
 We do not suggest that e-discovery practice provides a 
perfect parallel.  An important point of distinction is that we 
already know it is of high importance to gain access to 
individual-identifying information in the class notice context, 
see Eisen, 417 U.S. at 176 (“[I]ndividual notice to identifiable 
class members is … an unambiguous requirement of Rule 
23.”), and the billing records here are admitted to have such 
information, whereas the value of much discovery 
information will be largely unknown until tested.  
Nevertheless, these e-discovery principles may provide a 
helpful template.   
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B. Adequacy of Representatives 
 
Although we remand to the District Court to further 
address the notice issues, we also suggest that the Court 
consider again whether the Class Representatives can 
adequately represent all class members.  The Galleguillos 
Objectors allege that the Class Representatives are inadequate 
since none of them were “current subscribers subject to 
Sprint‟s illegal ETFs” at the time that the Settlement 
Agreement was executed. (Galleguillos Objectors‟ Opening 
Br. at 59.)  One of the essential problems with the settlement, 
as those objectors see it, is “the license it grants to Sprint to 
continue making illegal ETF charges against current 
subscribers.” (Id. at 60.)  According to the Galleguillos 
Objectors, because “[t]he claims of the class representatives 
are … atypical of the claims ….of [current subscribers,] … 
the class representatives are inadequate representatives.”  (Id.)  
Sprint responds that the Class Representatives satisfy the 
adequacy requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) because their interests 
“[were] not antagonistic to those of the class.”34  (Sprint‟s Br. 
                                              
34
 Sprint also emphasizes the adequacy of Class 
Counsel, as did the District Court, and we agree with Sprint 
and the District Court that Class Counsel were “well-
equipped to handle a case of this size and complexity.”  (AJA 
at 11.)  Sprint further argues that the Galleguillos Objectors 
lack standing to complain about the adequacy of the Class 
Representatives because those objectors allegedly conceded 
to the District Court that they themselves were not Sprint 
customers at the time that the Settlement Agreement was 
executed.  One of the Galleguillos Objectors, however, 
arguably was a current Sprint customer at the time that the 
Settlement Agreement was executed on December 3, 2008.  
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at 22 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).)  
 
As noted earlier, Rule 23(a)(4) provides that, in order 
to certify a class, a court must find that “the representative 
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).  “The adequacy inquiry 
under Rule 23(a)(4) serves to uncover conflicts of interest 
                                                                                                     
(See AJA at 1681 (“I, ANTRANICK HARRENTSIAN, 
declare … I had an account with Sprint … [and] [o]n or about 
December 8, 2008, Sprint charged my account for [two] early 
termination fees (ETFs) of $200 apiece, for a total of 
$400.”).)  Whether or not any of the Galleguillos Objectors 
were current Sprint customers at the time that the Settlement 
Agreement was executed, however, they still had 
constitutional standing to make such an objection because 
they were class members who had asserted that objection to 
the District Court.  See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 6-7 
(2002) (noting that as long as an individual is a member of 
the class, that individual “has an interest in the settlement that 
creates a „case or controversy‟ sufficient to satisfy the 
constitutional requirements of injury, causation, and 
redressability” (citations omitted)).  Even assuming arguendo 
that they did not have constitutional standing to bring an 
objection based on adequacy of representation, the District 
Court still has an independent duty to ensure that all class 
members are adequately represented.  See Greenfield, 483 
F.2d at 832 (noting “the district court [is] … the guardian of 
the rights of the absentees”); see also Ehrheart v. Verizon 
Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 593 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Under Rule 
23(e), a district court acts as a fiduciary, guarding the claims 
and rights of the absent class members.” (quoting In re AT&T 
Corp., 455 F.3d 160, 175 (3d Cir. 2006))).  
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between named parties and the class they seek to represent.”  
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997).  
More specifically, as we stated in In re Community Bank of 
Northern Virginia, the inquiry has two purposes: “to 
determine [1] that the putative named plaintiff has the ability 
and the incentive to represent the claims of the class 
vigorously, … and [2] that there is no conflict between the 
individual‟s claims and those asserted on behalf of the class.” 
35
  622 F.3d 275, 291 (3d Cir. 2010) (ellipsis in original) 
(quoting Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 179 (3d Cir. 1988)). 
“This inquiry is vital, as „class members with divergent or 
conflicting interests [from the named plaintiffs and class 
                                              
35
 Several other circuits are in accord.  See, e.g., Ellis 
v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 985 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(“To determine whether named plaintiffs will adequately 
represent a class, courts must resolve two questions: (1) do 
the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of 
interest with other class members and (2) will the named 
plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously on 
behalf of the class?” (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)); In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright 
Litig., 654 F.3d 242, 249 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Adequacy is 
twofold: the proposed class representative must have an 
interest in vigorously pursuing the claims of the class, and 
must have no interests antagonistic to the interests of other 
class members.” (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agr. 
Implement Workers of Am. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.3d 
615, 626 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Class representatives are adequate 
when it appear[s] that [they] will vigorously prosecute the 
interests of the class … .” (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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counsel] cannot be adequately represented… .‟”  Id. at 291-92 
(alteration in original) (quoting In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 385 F.3d 386, 395 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
 
In its opinion approving the settlement here, the 
District Court focused on the second purpose of the 
Community Bank inquiry as to Rule 23(a)(4), i.e., the “no 
conflict” part.36  The Court stated that “„the plaintiff must not 
have interests antagonistic to those of the class,‟” (AJA at 11 
(quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices 
Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450 (D.N.J. 1997))), and it found that the 
Class Representatives did not.   
 
If that were the complete test, we would perhaps be 
less concerned about the District Court‟s finding of adequacy 
under Rule 23(a)(4), but the test cited by the District Court 
fails to include the first and, in this instance,
37
 likely the most 
                                              
36
 As noted supra at note 34, as part of the Rule 
23(a)(4) inquiry, the District Court also analyzed whether 
Class Counsel was adequate.  “„Although questions 
concerning the adequacy of class counsel were traditionally 
analyzed under the aegis of the adequate representation 
requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) … those questions have, since 
2003, been governed by Rule 23(g).‟”  In re Cmty. Bank of N. 
Va., 622 F.3d at 292 (quoting Sheinberg v. Sorenson, 606 
F.3d 130, 132 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
37
 None of the objectors claim that the interests of the 
Class Representatives were “antagonistic” to those class 
members who were current subscribers subject to a flat-rate 
ETF on the date that the Settlement Agreement was executed.  
Merriam-Webster defines “antagonism” as “actively 
expressed opposition or hostility” or “opposition of a 
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important part of the Community Bank inquiry.  That part 
requires that the Class Representatives have “the ability and 
the incentive to represent the claims of the class vigorously.”  
In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d at 291 (citation omitted).  
Here, it is difficult to understand how the Class 
Representatives, none of whom were Sprint customers at the 
time that the Settlement Agreement was executed, had the 
interest, much less the incentive, to stop Sprint from 
enforcing flat-rate ETFs against its current customers.  Cf. id. 
at 311  (vacating decision to certify class “because the 
settlement appear[ed] to lack „structural assurance of fair and 
adequate representation for the diverse groups and individuals 
affected‟” (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627)); Nat’l Super 
Spuds, Inc. v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 660 F.2d 9, 17 n.6 (2d 
Cir. 1981) (“Th[e] justification for permitting the 
representatives to sue on behalf of the class has no application 
to claims of class members in which the representatives have 
no interest and which … they are willing to throw to the 
winds in order to settle their own claims.”). 
 
The District Court rejected the objectors‟ adequacy of 
representation argument, in part,
38
 because it found that, even 
if class members who were subscribers at the time that the 
Settlement Agreement was executed were still subject to a 
flat-rate ETF, those members would be entitled to the relief 
                                                                                                     
conflicting force, tendency, or principle.”  Merriam-
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 48 (10th ed. 2002). 
38
 The Court also pointed out that the injunctive relief 
that the Galleguillos Objectors sought “could potentially 
expose [current subscribers] to a counterclaim for damages 
from Sprint.”  (AJA at 12.) 
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afforded under Category IV of the Settlement Agreement.  
We briefly note, however, the dissimilar treatment received 
by class members who only qualified for benefits under 
Category IV, but who were similarly situated to class 
members who qualified for benefits either under Category I 
(charged and paid a flat-rate ETF) or Category II (charged but 
did not pay a flat-rate ETF).
39
   Those class members who 
were Sprint customers as of March 15, 2010 – the claim 
deadline for Categories I and II
40
 – but terminated their 
contract between March 15 and December 31, 2010 and were 
charged a flat-rate ETF,
41
 only qualified for benefits under 
Category IV, which provided for certain non-cash relief.
42
  
                                              
39
 We recognize that, while adequacy of representation 
cannot be determined solely by reviewing the settlement 
benefits available to class members, examining such benefits 
may be indicative of whether the Class Representatives did, 
in fact, vigorously represent the claims of all class members.  
See In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 
654 F.3d 242, 252 (2d Cir. 2011) (“The Supreme Court‟s 
decision in Amchem … allows courts, in assessing the 
adequacy of representation, to examine a settlement‟s 
substance for evidence of prejudice to the interests of a subset 
of plaintiffs.”). 
40
 The deadline for submitting a claim form to receive 
Category IV benefits was January 1, 2011.   
41
 The last flat-rate ETF contract did not expire until 
December 31, 2010.  See supra note 5. 
42
 Specifically, Category IV provides that qualifying 
class members are entitled to receive one of three benefits: (i) 
a prepaid 90 minute long distance calling card; (ii) if the class 
member wanted to activate a new line of service with Sprint, 
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That relief is far different from the relief that other similarly 
situated class members were entitled to under Category I or 
Category II.
43
  (See AJA at 285 (providing a $90 payment to 
class members under a two year contract who terminated any 
time between the seventh and twenty-fourth month and paid a 
flat-rate ETF); AJA at 287-88 (providing a $90 credit to class 
members under a two year contract who terminated any time 
between the seventh and twenty-fourth month and were 
charged, but did not pay, a flat-rate ETF).)   
 
Nevertheless, because that objection was not made 
before the District Court with the clarity it has been pressed 
                                                                                                     
a waiver of the $36 activation fee normally associated with a 
two-year contract, and 100 free bonus minutes per month for 
the first year of that two year contract; or (iii) 300 free text 
messages per month for six months.    
Throughout oral argument, class members who only 
qualified for Category IV benefits were referred to as those in 
the “donut hole.”  The term “donut hole” captures the idea 
that there is a difference in coverage between class members 
in Categories I and II and other members who were similarly 
situated to them but were unable to acquire the same relief 
under the Settlement Agreement. 
43
 Indeed, Class Counsel concedes as much.  (See 
Class Counsel Rule 28(j) Ltr. at 1 (“Except for subscribers in 
the ‘donut hole’, all persons with a flat-rate ETF who 
terminated their contract and were charged an ETF, whether 
before or after the settlement, were identically situated and 
identically treated, thus, were adequately represented.” 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted)).)  
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on us,
44
 we will not opine on the District Court‟s conclusion 
that the Class Representatives can adequately represent all 
class members.  That being said, because the case must be 
considered again on the notice issue, and because the 
adequacy issue is one of high significance, we urge the 
District Court to consider again in greater detail whether the 
Class Representatives are adequate under Rule 23(a)(4).   
 
                                              
44
 In its letter submitted pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 28(j), Class Counsel argues that because 
the Galleguillos Objectors did not specifically raise the 
“donut hole” objection prior to oral argument, they have 
waived it.  That assertion is debatable.  The Galleguillos 
Objectors did object to the adequacy of representation based 
on the fact that Sprint was still allowed to charge flat-rate 
ETFs against current subscribers who had contracts 
containing flat-rate ETFs, and a logical extension of that 
objection can arguably be that Sprint could continue to 
enforce flat-rate ETFs without a remedy for those subscribers 
that was identical to what other similarly situated class 
members received under the Settlement Agreement.  That 
being said, because those objectors did not explain this issue 
to the District Court in nearly the level of detail as they 
explained it to us at oral argument, the waiver argument that 
Class Counsel advances is not without weight.  Whether or 
not the “donut hole” objection was waived, we note again that 
the District Court has an independent duty to ensure that all 
class members are adequately represented.  See supra note 34. 
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III. Conclusion 
 
With full appreciation for the considerable efforts that 
have been invested in the settlement of this class action, we 
emphasize again the judicial duty to act as the guardian of 
absent class members.  For the reasons stated, we conclude 
that that duty was not fully met and, accordingly, vacate the 
District Court‟s January 15, 2010 order and remand the case 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
